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ABSTRACT 
One of the most important challenges facing mankind today is the formulation of strategies for 
sustainable development. These are strategies that could reduce poverty in the current generation, 
without making development more difficult in the future. One response to this challenge has been 
the creation at IIASA of a simulation model of development, population, and the environment on 
Mauritius. The main purpose of this paper is to put the IIASA Mauritius model into perspective by 
(1) comparing it with other simulation models that include environmental considerations, and (2) 
showing how these models contribute to the debate about ewnomic, environmental, and demographic 
interactions. 
In addition to the IIASA Mauritius model, four others are considered in this paper. The first, 
the Wonderland Model, is used to introduce essential modeling concepts. The second, World3, is the 
basis of the books The Limits to Growth (1972) and Bevond the LimiQ (1992), and undoubtedly the 
most famous and most criticized model of sustainable development ever published. The World3 model 
suggests the likelihood of a dreadful environmental collapse within the next eighty years if population 
growth and economic growth do not soon come to an end. The third, a model of the Sahel model by 
Anthony Picardi, appeared as an MTT Ph.D. dissertation in 1974 and is still one of the best pieces of 
work ever done in the area. It deals with, among other things, an actual environmental collapse that 
occurred in the Sahel in the early 1970s. The last is the POMA model of population and environment 
in Costa Rica in 1990. It is a simple framework that takes the environment into account, but does not 
allow any feedbacks from the environment to the economy. Each of the four teaches us lessons that 
are used to broaden our understanding the IIASA Mauritius model. 
The debate on demographic, environmental, and economic interactions has, in many instances, 
been an acrimonious one with people maintaining that economic growth and population growth must 
soon come to an end or an environmental catastrophe is imminent, that more rapid economic growth 
is the key to reducing both environmental degradation and population growth, and that reduced 
population growth is the key to more rapid ewnomic growth and reduced probabilities of 
environmental collapse. The models reviewed here are used as frameworks within which to address 
these conflicting viewpoints. 
Models of environmental, demographic, and economic interactions have had frightfully short 
lifetimes and, typically, no descendants. One of the most important challenges facing those interested 
in these interactions today is the development of strategies of sustainable modeling. 
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Economic development and sound environmental management are complementary. 
Development can contribute to improved environmental management, and a healthy 
environment is essential for sustaining development. World Develo~ment Report, 1992 
7he idea that the two pursuits - economic development that looks ajer the welfare of 
people, their needs and wants, and environmental conservation that attends to the welfare 
of the world - can go along merrily hand in hand as equals is false. The first priority has 
to be the welfare of surrounding ecosystems, for without their healthy functioning no 
economic system can last. J .  Stan Rowe, Planet Under Stress, 1990 
At this stage, there are major uncertainties about greenhouse theory, about the eflects 
of a possible warming, and about the economic and political impacts of hasty, ill- 
considered policies. Does it make sense to waste $100 billion a year on what is still a 
phantom threat when there are so many pressing - and real - problems in need of 
resources? S. Fred Singer, The Bulletin of the Atomic ScientisQ, 1992 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. The Challenges 
It now appears that one of the most important challenges facing people in the 21st century will 
be sustainable development. It is a challenge because it is not clear that the progressive alleviation 
of poverty in the Third World, even at the current less than desirable rates, and the continuation of 
economic growth in the First and Second Worlds over the next century is feasible, given the Earth's 
environmental and ecological constraints. It is an important challenge because the human, 
environmental, and economic costs of a crash would be stupendous. 
The challenge facing people interested in sustainable development is how to make progress in 
an area full of contradictory analyses. This book and the simulation model of sustainable development 
in Mauritius, which is its centerpiece, are responses to this challenge. The purpose of this chapter 
is to put that response into perspective. 
1.2. Simulation Models 
Simulation models come in many forms and serve many purposes. Perhaps the best known 
simulation models today are the simulators used by pilots to learn how to fly their aircraft in a variety 
of unusual circumstances. Nowadays some of these simulators are so good that the experience of 
"flying" them is very close to the real thing. On the other hand, simulation models used for predicting 
the weather one or two days into the future are not nearly that precise. Still these imperfect models 
turn out to be very useful in practice; millions of people check their results every day. The designs 
of computer chips are regularly tested using simulation models. Those chips are so complex that it 
is impossible for engineers to know whether they will behave according their specifications without 
testing either physical prototypes or computerized models. Chip simulation software allows engineers 
to see how a chip would function under various conditions without building it. Thus, simulation 
models are not something far outside our everyday experience. We rely on their results whenever we 
fly in a commercial jet aircraft, use a personal computer, or listen to a weather forecast. In this 
chapter, we rely on their results to teach us about sustainable development. 
What simulation models have in common is that they are all simplified representations of 
complex systems. To the extent that the representation is a useful one, we can learn about the 
behavior of the complex system by experiencing or studying the behavior of a less complicated model. 
Typically, simulation models are not "solved" just once, but are run many times to get a "feel" for 
how they function in a variety of circumstances. People turn to simulation models because for one 
reason or another it is infeasible to test the system directly. It is not possible to teach pilots about the 
consequences of engine explosions through direct experience nor is it desirable to teach policy-makers 
about the consequences of their actions by making them experience real environmental catastrophes. 
Crashes are much cheaper in a flight simulator or in a model of sustainable development than they are 
in reality. 
1.3. Simulation Models of Sustainable Development 
Box 1: Definition of Sustainable Development 
There exist many simulation models of the process of economic development.' Simulation 
models of sustainable develovment are relatively new, and they differ from the others in that they 
explicitly embed models of economic and social interactions in an environmental framework. From 
one perspective, it seems perfectly clear that all economies exist within an environmental context and, 
'See Sanderson (1980) and Meadows and Robinson (1985) for a discussion of some of these models. 
therefore, odd that environmental considerations have traditionally been omitted. But a modeler's 
perspective is different. It is a cardinal principle of modeling that all quantitatively unimportant 
phenomena should be excluded from consideration. So long as the environment was seen as 
essentially irrelevant, it was entirely appropriate for it to have been left out. The new interest in 
models of sustainable development arises because of the realization that environmental influences may 
play an important role in the development process. 
1.4. Outline 
Models of sustainable development are complex. To explain them better we have constructed 
a simple model of a place that we call Wonderland. In Section 2, we explore the Wonderland model 
in detail and use it as an example for discussing the basic concepts of sustainable development 
modeling. We show there how it is possible to get Wonderland to experience dreadful environmental 
crashes and how to get it to experience sustainable prosperity. Armed with models of crashes and 
prosperity, we address the debate between economists and ecologists on environmental issues. In 
Wonderland, the nature of their disagreement becomes quite clear. 
Once we have been through Wonderland, other models of sustainable development will seem 
less curious. In Section 3, we discuss the World3 model, a sustainable development model for the 
world, made famous in The Limits to Growth (1972) and Bevond the Limits (1992). World3 is best- 
known for its suggestion that the world is not on a sustainable course, and that without a significant 
change in orientation, we will almost surely crash. There we apply what we learned in Section 2 to 
analyze the causes of those crashes. World3 itself did not result in a line of developing and improving 
models. Instead, it died under a barrage of withering criticism, despite the attempt of some of its 
authors to resurrect it intact twenty years later. In Section 3, we also will see what can be learned 
from the mistakes of World3. 
The first model of sustainable development devoted to an area smaller than the world was 
produced by Anthony Picardi in 1974 in a study of the Sahel. His work was truly pathbreaking and, 
sadly, so far ahead of its time that it was never published. Picardi's model deals with a real 
economic, demographic, and environmental crash in the Sahel in the early 1970s. His model provides 
a convincing and detailed account of what caused the crash and what the future of the Sahel would 
be under a broad range of policies. In the current era of heightened environmental awareness, it is 
time for modelers to rediscover this excellent piece of work. We devote Section 4 to considering the 
sustainability of development in the Sahel through the prism of the Picardi model. It turns out to have 
a great deal to teach us. 
One of the oldest continuing modeling traditions belongs to the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), through its funding of three RAPID projects over the last two 
decades. RAPID stands for "Resources for the Awareness of Population Impacts on Development" 
and the models produced under those projects are designed for presentation rather than study. 
Recently, RAPID I11 models have developed more elaborated environmental structures. In Section 
5, we discuss the most recent RAPID model for Costa Rica and show what it teaches us about the 
interactions between population growth and the environment. 
The Mauritius model is presented in broad terms in Section 6. We describe its structure and 
show how it provides a badly needed new perspective. We briefly discuss other related models in 
Section 7 and conclude with some thoughts on the development of sustainable models. 
2. SIMULATION MODELING O F  DEVELOPMENT PATHS: IN THEORY 
2.1. Introduction 
Simulations of development paths are, generally, produced within a framework composed of 
three basic components: (1) a set of equations, called the model, that specify how variables are related 
to one another, (2) a set of numbers, called parameters, that give specific form to the model's 
equations, and (3) a development scenario that specifies the model's initial conditions, and the time 
profiles of all its exogenous ~ar iab les .~  If the resulting simulations are to address questions of 
sustainable development, a fourth component must be added, one that we call sustainability 
considerations. For those without technical background, these models often seem like black boxes. 
Certain things go in; certain things come out, but what happens inside is shrouded in mystery. In this 
section, we open one particular black box and allow the readers to look inside. The box contains a 
model that incorporates economic, demographic, and environmental interactions. It has eight 
equations, thirteen parameters, four initial conditions, and one time path of an exogenous variable. 
Because of its small size, it is possible to go through an entire simulation exercise with everything in 
plain view. 
2.2. The Wonderland Model of Sustainable Development 
To make the basic concepts more concrete, let us consider the simple model of economic, 
demographic, and environmental interactions presented in equations (1) through (8) below. Equations 
(1) and (2) deal with the economy, equations (3) through (5) with the population, equations (6) and 
(7) with the environment, and equation (8) with environmental policy. The subscript t in the equations 
refers to the year in which the variables are measured, and all Greek letters refer to parameters of the 
model. These parameters are discussed more fully in subsection 2.3 below. 
Box 2: Notation - Wonderland Model 
Equation (1) says that per capita output in year t+  1, I,,,, depends on the level of per capita 
output in year t, I,, the level of the stock of natural capital in year t, MY,, and three parameters y, q ,  
and A. Natural capital may be thought of as the set of things provided to us by the environment, like 
air and water, which allows us to live healthy and productive lives. When natural capital is 
undiminished by pollution, the stock is given a value of 1.0. As more pollution occurs, the level of 
ZExogenous variables influence the other variables in the model, but are not themselves influenced 
by any of them. 
the stock of natural capital diminishes, until, in the extreme, it reaches 0.0. Equation (1) incorporates 
the assumption that the lower the stock of natural capital, the lower the rate of per capita output 
growth. When NK, is equal to 1.0, the rate of economic growth is y; when NK, is equal to 0.0, the 
rate of economic shrinkage is equal to 7. 
Equation (2) simply defines net per capita output as the difference between the level of per capita 
output in equation (1) and per capita expenditure on pollution control. The latter is determined by 
pollution control policy, as expressed in equation (8). Standard economic accounting procedures do 
not put a (negative) value on pollution, but do include pollution control expenditures. Therefore, 
offsetting increases in pollution and pollution control expenditures, which leave stocks of natural 
capital unchanged, show up as increases in per capita output. To avoid this possibility, net per capita 
output is used in Wonderland as the measure of economic well-being. 
Equations (3), (4), and (5) make up the demographic portion of the model. Equation (3) 
determines the crude birth rate (the ratio of births to the population multiplied by 1,000) and equation 
(4) the crude death rate (the ratio of deaths to the population multiplied by 1,000). The model 
assumes that both crude rates decrease with increases in net per capita output. In addition, equation 
(4) stipulates that decreases in the stock of natural capital cause the crude death rate to rise. Equation 
(5) is an accounting identity that computes the population in year t + l  based on the population in year 
t and the intervening numbers of births and deaths3. 
The environmental portion of the model appears in equations (6) and (7). Equation (6) 
determines the annual flow of pollutants as a function of the population size, per capita output, the 
technologies of production and pollution abatement, and on the amount of money that is spent on 
pollution control. Equation (7) shows how the combination of the pollution flow and nature's ability 
to cleanse itself interact to produce changes in the stock of natural capital. 
The final equation represents environmental policy. Here the stock of natural capital is 
constantly monitored and the amount of money per person spent on pollution control determined 
depending on per capita output and the stock of natural capital. Per capita spending on pollution 
control is assumed to increase with per capita output and to increase as the stock of natural capital 
decreases. 
These eight equations make up the entire model. We will return to a more detailed look at some 
of the equations below. 
%e model assumes that there is no net migration. 
The Wonderland model: 
Economy 
It+l = 1,{1 +y -(y +q) i l  - N K J ~ ]  
NI, = It - PC, 
BR, - DR, 
N.4 = Nt[l  + [ )I 
Environment 
PF, = Nt.It.T - K 
Environmental Policy 
PC, = @.(I - NKJP*It 
2.3 The Parameters 
The 13 Greek letters in the model are 
parameters. They must be given specific values 
before the model can be run. If the parameters 
cannot be precisely estimated, the modeler has 
a dificult decision to make - either to leave out 
some potentially important segment of the model 
or to include parameter values that are just 
educated guesses. When weak parameter values 
are included, the modeler should always show 
the reader how sensitive the results are to those 
values. Models vary from having just a few 
parameters to having hundreds of them. In the 
larger models, there might be scores of 
parameters whose values are estimated 
imprecisely. The parameters for Wonderland 
appear in Box 3. For the moment, let us 
assume that they have all been precisely 
estimated. 
2.4. Initial Conditions and Exogenous 
Variables 
Before, we can produce any simulated Box 3: Parameters - Wonderland Model 
futures, we have two more things to do. First, 
we must specify the current state of affairs, and second, we must stipulate future time paths of the 
exogenous variable, T, the amount of pollution per unit of output. The initial conditions for our 
model refer to the year 1990 and appear in Box 4. The 1990 levels of per capita output, population, 
and pollution per unit of output are all standardized to 1. This is just a matter of convenience. When 
per capita output, for example, rises to 2, we know that it is twice its 1990 level. When the pollution 
rate is 0.5, we know that it is half what it was in 1990. Setting the stock of natural capital at 0.98 
is a more serious matter. The stock is only defined in the range between 0 and 1. As opposed to the 
other three initial conditions, which essentially can be set at whatever one wishes, the stock of natural 
capital in 1990 influences the dynamic evolution of the system. 
The Wonderland model has only one 
exogenous variable, the amount of pollution per 
unit of output. It appears in equation (6) where 
it is denoted by T for "technology" because it 
combines the effects of the technology of 
production and the technology of pollution 
control. According to Commoner (1992), in 
many developing countries, the adoption of 
more modern technologies has brought with it 
an increase in pollution per unit of output. The 
more polluting and more modem technologies 
have been adouted more rapidly than have 
- 
equivalent pollution control technologies. For Box 4: Initial Conditions - Wonderland Model 
the moment, we will take the more optimistic 
view that pollution per unit of output will decrease at an annual rate of one percent per m u m .  
2.5. The Sustainability of Development 
Now we have all the pieces necessary to 
produce simulated future development paths in 
Wonderland - the model, the parameters, the 
initial conditions, and the future time paths of 
the exogenous variable4. The combination of 
initial conditions and future time paths of 
exogenous variables is usually called a scenario, 
and the resulting simulated future development 
path is often referred to as the output of a 
"run," "experiment," or "scenario." 
The Time Path of the Exogenous Variable 
Variable - Wonderland Model 
Below in 2.7, we will encounter our first simulated future and will need to ascertain whether 
the development path is sustainable or not. The World Commission on Environment and Development 
(1987), often known as the Bmndtland Commission, defined sustainable development as "development 
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs" (see Box 1). In Wonderland, we implement the Brundtland Commission definition with 
two criteria. We call a development path unsustainable if it entails: (1) the current generation having 
a higher level of net per capita output at the expense of future generations who must have lower 
levels, or (2) the current generation having a lower death rate at the expense of future generations who 
must suffer higher rates. Any particular sustainability criteria that are used to evaluate simulated 
futures are, like the models to which they refer, partly a matter of judgement. 
In practice, models are solved over a 
finite, and in ecological terms, brief period. 
Thus, a development path that is sustainable 
over the simulation period may not be 
sustainable over a longer one. It follows that 
the simulation period must be short enough for 
the model to be useful, yet long enough for the 
question of sustainability to be meaningful. We 
call the period over which sustainability is 
defined the "sustainability horizon. " In 
Wonderland, the sustainability horizon is 11 1 
years, from 1990 through 2100. 
2.6. Positive and Negative Feedback Loops 
Before we see how Wonderland evolves, Box 6: Sustainability Criteria - Wonderland 
it is important to take a moment to consider the Model 
factors in the model that influence its 
development path. Of chief important, in most dynamic models, is the existence and nature of 
feedback loops. Feedback loops exist when, for example, variable A influences variable B which 
influences variable C which influences variable A, perhaps sometime in the future. A negative 
feedback loop occurs when increase (decreases) in variable A result in changes in other variables that, 
in turn, put 4- (upward) pressure on it. A positive feedback loop occurs when increases 
(decreases) in variable A result in changes in other variables that, in turn, put u~ward (downward) 
'In this case, though, there is only one exogenous variable. 
pressure on it. Negative feedback loops dampen changes in variables; positive feedback loops 
reinforce them. 
Wonderland has both positive and negative feedback loops. When the emission of pollutants in 
Wonderland goes up, the stock of natural capital goes down. When the stock of natural capital goes 
down, expenditures on pollution control go up, thus causing the emissions of pollutants to go down. 
This is a negative feedback loop because there are forces in the model that tend to dampen changes 
in emissions. On the other hand, the ability of nature to eliminate pollution depends on the level of 
the stock of natural capital. As the stock of natural capital goes down, the same amount of pollution 
has a bigger negative effect on it because of those diminished recuperative powers. Thus, a lower 
stock of natural capital sets in motion forces that cause the stock of natural capital to fall even further. 
This is a positive feedback loop because there are forces in the model that reinforce changes in the 
stock of natural capital. The future of Wonderland depends on whether the negative or the positive 
feedback loops dominate. 
2.7. One Side of the Looking-Glass: The Environmentalists' Nightmare 
The model, parameter values, initial conditions, and the future path of the exogenous variable 
imply development paths for all the endogenous variables in the model. Figure 1 shows the rise and 
then dramatic collapse of both net and gross per capita output in Wonderland. Net per capita output 
reaches a peak of 19.4 in 2066, and falls 59 percent in the ensuing ten years. Twenty years after its 
peak, net per capita output is barely one-quarter of what it was. Clearly, this development path 
violates the Brundtland Commission's definition of sustainability. People in Wonderland before 2066 
were compromising the ability of the next generation to meet its needs. Their high standard of living 
was borrowed at the expense of the future. 
Figure 2 shows what happens to the crude birth and death rates, and the size of the population. 
Over time, both the crude birth rate and the crude death rate fall as net per capita output rises. The 
rate of population growth declines over time from 2.4 percent per year in 1990 to 0.55 percent in 
2066. After the crisis, death rates skyrocket from 16.5 in 2066 to 54.8 in 2076 and continue climbing 
slowly thereafter. This high death rate overwhelms the crude birth rate, which itself rises some, and 
the population begins to shrink. Thus, this development path also violates the death rate criterion for 
sustainability. The people before 2066 jeopardized the health of future generations. Their low death 
rates were purchased at the expense of the health of their children and grandchildren. 
Figure 3 shows why the collapse occurred. The combination of economic growth, population 
growth, improvements in pollution control technology, and policies toward pollution control 
expenditures resulted in an ever rising level of pollution. This could be accommodated in the 
environment, in essence, because the pollution flows were not large relative to nature's ability to 
handle them. Thus, for a long time, the stock of natural capital is not degraded, even as the pollution 
flow increases. To three decimal places of accuracy, we can see the first very minor signs of decrease 
in the stock of natural capital in 2060. By that time, the flows of pollution are large, compared to 
what nature, with the aid of man's pollution control expenditures, can handle and the stock of natural 
capital collapses. 



Box 7: Nonlinearities in Environmental Variables 
Pollution control expenditures (not shown here) are essentially zero from 1990 through 2063. 
They rise slowly at first, after 2063 and then jump enormously when the magnitude of the 
environmental crisis is realized. Unfortunately, by that time it is too late. Even the astronomical 
expenditures on pollution control in the late 2060s and 2070s cannot repair the damage done to the 
environment. As the economy and the population of Wonderland shrink, so eventually do pollution 
control expenditures. 
The rate of pollution declines steadily throughout the simulation period. In other words, people 
are producing less and less pollution per unit output as time goes on. The collapse has nothing to do 
with a change in the rate pollution reduction. Even with increasing expenditures on pollution control, 
a declining rate of pollution, and a falling rate of population growth, the collapse still occurs. What 
makes this simulated future so nightmarish is that the calamity occurs so quickly and with so little 
warning. 
Imagine two people in Wonderland dressed in tee-shirts and shorts arguing loudly in front of 
a crowd of people. The time is 2050. His tee-shirt reads "ECOLOGIST"; hers reads 
"ECONOMIST. " 
"Look," he said, "we've been polluting the country for sixty years now at an increasing rate. 
Sooner or later it is just going to be too much for the environment to handle. We need to cut back 
on our pollution now!" 
"We've been growing very nicely for sixty years now," she replied. "Poverty has been 
substantially reduced, birth rates are going down, death rates are going down, and the population 
growth rate is falling. We're doing just fine, no thanks to you. If we listened to you years ago, we 
would have cut back, then, and had more poverty now." 
"Nonsense," he said, "the environment is not like an economic system, it is subject to all sorts 
of discontinuities. Things can look like they're OK for a long time while environmental stresses build 
up and then, all of a sudden there's a discontinuous change." 
"Yea," she said, "show me a discontinuous change over the last sixty years." 
The crowd doesn't know what to conclude from these mutually contradictory arguments. We 
now understand that business went on as usual and that seventeen years later a dreadful crash 
occurred, destroying the economy and causing a horrible rise in death rates. But in 2050, without the 
Wonderland model, they couldn't have known that. ECOLOGIST would have been awarded the 
Nobel prize in biology for his work on discontinuities in polluted ecological systems, except that, after 
the crash, money was short and the prizes were discontinued. 
Look, the two are wandering over toward that mirror and the crowd is following. Let's follow 
too. 
2.8. On the Other Side of the L~oking-Glass: The Economists' Dream 
On this side of the looking-glass, 
Wonderland looks very familiar. The eight 
equations in the model are identical, the thirteen 
parameters are all identical, and the four initial 
conditions are all the same. The only thing that 
is different is the time path of the exogenous 
variable, T (pollution per unit of output). 
Where we came from, pollution per unit of 
output fell by 1 percent per year; on this side of 
the looking glass it falls by 4 percent per year. 
Figures 4 through 6 indicate the future of 
Wonderland on this side of the looking-glass. 
Figure 4 shows that per capita output and Box 8: Change in the Time Path of the 
per capita output after adjustment for pollution Exogfflous Variable - Wonderland Model 
control costs grow steadily. Now there is 
sustainable prosperity in Wonderland not an environmental catastrophe. Figure 5 shows that, over 
time, the birth rate converges to the death rate and that, by the end of the 21st century, population 
growth stops. There is never a time when the crude death rate rises precipitously. We call this 
simulated future, the economists' dream. Clearly, the economists' dream future is sustainable 
according to the definition that we gave above. Each generation leaves to the future the means to live 
longer and more prosperous lives. 
Figure 6 shows that the population growth and the economic growth do cause an increase in the 
flow of pollution, and that the increase is not large enough to degrade the stock of natural capital. 
Indeed, the pollution flow itself reaches a peak in 2083 and falls continuously thereafter. Thus, by 
the end of 21st century, population is stable, the economy is growing, pollution flows are falling, and 
the level of the stock of natural capital is consistently high. 
Pollution control expenditures, which are essentially zero throughout the period, are not 
presented here. By assumption, the rate of pollution falls more rapidly in the economists' dream 
scenario than in the environmentalists' nightmare scenario. At the time of the crisis in the latter 
experiment, 2066, the rate of pollution was 0.461, while ,in the former it was less than one-tenth that 
level. 
There's that pair arguing again; it's still 2050 and the same crowd is still trying to make sense 
out of their arguments. Let's listen too. 
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"Look," he said, "we've been polluting the country for sixty years now at an increasing rate. 
Sooner or later it is just going to be too much for the environment to handle. We need to cut back 
on our pollution now!" 
"We've been growing very nicely for sixty years now," she replied. "Poverty has been 
substantially reduced, birth rates are going down, death rates are going down, and the population 
growth rate is falling. We're doing just fine, no thanks to you. If we listened to you years ago, we 
would have cut back, then, and had more poverty now." 
"Nonsense," he said, "the environment is not like an economic system, it is subject to all sorts 
of discontinuities. Things can look like they're OK for a long time while environmental stresses build 
up and then, all of a sudden there's a discontinuous change." 
"Yea," she said, "show me a discontinuous change over the last sixty years." 
The crowd, listening to this argument, is thoroughly confused. We now know that nothing 
changed, that growth continued and that Wonderland became a prosperous developed country, but in 
2050, without the Wonderland model, they couldn't have known that. Seventeen year later, 
ECONOMIST is given the Nobel prize in economics for her work on continuities in polluted economic 
systems. 
We could ask which view is the correct one, the view from this side of the looking-glass or the 
other one, but there would be no answer to that question. In a sense, both are correct. With a 
simulation model, we can only make conditional statements. Given the model, the parameters, the 
initial conditions and the time path of the exogenous variables, the model can produce a path of 
development. With different time paths of the exogenous variables, perhaps only slightly different 
from the original ones, the model's outcomes might change quite radically, as we have seen. 
How, then, can we improve our understanding of the interrelationships between economic, 
demographic, and environmental variables? To make progress, we must create models of particular 
regions or countries where the important relationships are specified with care and where potential 
policies are included explicitly. This is exactly what the Mauritius model does. Before, we get to 
Mauritius, though, we have to go through three other models, three other lands. Each has a lesson 
to teach. 
There's a little bridge ahead. It says "World" on it. Let's see what's on the other side. 
3. THE WORLD3 MODEL 
Advocates of a world view that is diflerent from the one presented here would enhance 
future discussions if they would express their theory as a fonnal model, so that persons 
in various fields could personally scrutinize its assumptions and independently determine 
its implications. . . . l b s e  who agree with the basic ideas expressed in World3 can go on 
to test, improve, and disaggregate the model and to use it where appropriate as a basis 
for policy in local, regional, or national systems. Meadows et al. (1974) p. 563 
3.1. Introduction 
The World3 model is an economic, demographic, and environmental model of the world taken 
as a whole. It is the outcome of a rapid evolutionary process that took place between 1970 and 1972. 
Since then the development of the model has come to a complete halt.5 World1 (although it did not 
have that name) was produced by Jay Forrester between June and July 1970 to demonstrate to The 
Club of Rome the usefulness and the power of the system dynamics approach to global m~del ing .~  
This model was quickly expanded and it was published in Forrester (1971). In this form the model 
became known as World2. When The Club of Rome decided in 1970 to support an even more 
detailed study, the task was taken on by a team headed by Dennis Meadows. In less than two years, 
the Meadows group developed the World2 model into World3 and produced the best selling book, m e  
Limits to Growth. By the early 1980s, that book had already sold over three million copies and 
World3 easily became the most famous model of sustainable development ever produced. Today, it 
comfortably maintains this distinction. 
Along with its popularity came a substantial amount of notoriety. Meadows et al. (1982, p. 23) 
call World3 "one of the most criticized models of all time." Criticisms bring with them the 
opportunity for improvement and with so many suggestions and so many interested parties, it seems 
natural that World3 should have evolved into something better, that by now there would be World4, 
Worlds, and World6 models. Nevertheless, this evolution has not occurred. Understanding why 
World3 has turned out to be an evolutionary dead-end, even for its creators, provides important 
background for understanding the role of the Mauritius model, which traces its roots to an entirely 
different stock. 
3.2. The Structure of the World3 Model 
World3 is a medium sized model consisting of 149 equations and tables. The population 
segment of the model includes 48 equations, the economic segment 81 equations, and the natural 
resources and pollution segment 18 equations. The detailed structure of the World3 model appears 
in Meadows et al. (1974). This is a truly remarkable volume in many respects. It is one of the most 
complete model descriptions ever published. Not only are the equations of the model described in 
detail, but the outlook and the data that led the authors to choose various functional relationships are 
disc~ssed.~ The listing of the entire model appears on pages 567-586. Although, it has been readily 
accessible for almost two decades now, the World3 model has not been developed. 
m e  version of the model used in Meadows et al. (1992) is virtually the same as the one used in 
Meadows et al. (1972). 
%s discussion is based on Groping in the Dark (1982) pp. 22-23. 
7Apparently, we owe the completeness of documentation to the teachings of Jay Forrester (see 
Meadows et al. (1982) p. 23). 
The World3 model keeps track of the population in four broad age groups, 0-14, 1 5 4 ,  45-64 
and 65 and above. Population growth is determined by the difference between the crude birth rate 
and the crude death rate as in the Wonderland model, but the determinants of those rates are much 
more elaborate than in the earlier model. First let us consider the death rate side. An increase in 
industrial output, holding population size and age structure fixed, brings with it an increase in 
pollution that increases the crude death rate. An increase in industrial output also entails more 
crowding, which also causes an increase in death rates. Thus, an increase in industrial output has an 
unambiguously negative effect on the crude death rate. An increase in service output per capita causes 
an increase in pollution and an increase in medical services per capita; therefore, it has an ambiguous 
effect on death rates. Similarly, an increase in agricultural production increases pollution and 
increases food availability per capita, making its effect on death rates also ambiguous. Population 
growth, holding output constant, increases pollution, increases crowding, decreases food per capita, 
and health services per capita, causing an increase in the death rate. 
On the fertility side, the crude birth rate increases with life expectancy (which in turn depends 
on pollution, crowding and other factors described above). Industrial output growth is postulated to 
have two opposing effects on fertility, a negative one through the changes in social norms and a 
positive one due to improvements in the economic position of couples. The negative influence is 
assumed to occur with a substantial lag. The crude birth rate is also influenced by the effectiveness 
of fertility control, which in turn depends upon the extent of family planning services per capita, and 
desired fertility. 
Education is not included in the World3 model. There can be no doubt that this is a serious 
omission, especially since of the effects of education on mortality, fertility, as well as on labor 
productivity are substantial. 
3.2.2. Economy 
The economy is divided into three sectors, industry, services, and agriculture. 
3.2.2.1. Industry and Services 
Industrial and service output depend on the amounts of capital in those two sectors multiplied 
by sector-specific output-capital ratios. Only in extreme conditions of rapid population decline does 
the size of the labor force constrain output. In usual times, the model assumes that there is chronic 
unemployment and that neither the size of the labor force nor its training and education have any 
bearing on output. 
To understand how the model functions, imagine that we begin this year with the industrial and 
service capital stocks we inherited from the past. Industrial and service output levels are determined 
simply by multiplying those stocks by the respective output-capital ratios. Most service output is 
consumed and vanishes from the model. Some service output goes into health services that influence 
the crude death rate and family planning services that influence the crude birth rate. Services do not 
use natural resources or cause pollution, and essentially play a very minor role in the model. In many 
accounting frameworks, electricity production appears in the service sector. Clearly, this would be 
inappropriate in the World3 framework. 
Industrial output is far more central to the model than are services. The first claimant on 
industrial capital is the amount needed to obtain natural resources.' What industrial capital remains 
is then used to produce industrial output. The amount of industrial output is the amount of industrial 
capital not used to obtain natural resources, multiplied by the industrial output-capital ratio. A fixed 
fraction of industrial output is consumed and vanishes from the model. Other fractions allocate the 
remainder to investments in agriculture, services, and industry. 
Each year agricultural, service, and industrial capital stocks are assumed to be diminished by 
depreciation and augmented by investments. The new capital stocks at the beginning of the next 
period are determined by adding net investments to the stocks at the beginning of this period. From 
this point, we return to the beginning of our discussion, determine the output of services from the new 
service capital stock, and compute the output of industry, after subtracting the capital required for 
obtaining natural resources from the new industrial capital stock. 
Industrial output is central to another area of the model as well. Industrial output requires 
nonrenewable resources. The use of these nonrenewable resources causes persistent pollution (all 
pollution except air pollution), which decreases the fertility of agricultural land and increases the crude 
death rate. In addition, industrial output has a direct negative impact on agricultural yields because 
of air pollution. Persistent pollution and air pollution have no direct effect on industrial or service 
output. 
3.2.2.2. Agriculture 
The agricultural sector is the most complex in the model. Food is produced on arable land 
according to a particular yield.9 The amount of arable land and the agricultural yield in any period 
is predetermined by past circumstances. Next period's amount of arable land and yield will be 
influenced by investment decisions made in this period and by the lagged effects of previous decisions. 
The fraction of total available capital that gets invested in agriculture depends on the relationship 
between the amount of food produced per capita and the amount of food desired per capita. The 
amount of food desired increases with the amount of industrial output and population size. The 
amount of food produced depends on the product of the amount of land and the yield. In general, as 
the ratio of food produced to food desired goes down, an ever larger share of available capital is be 
devoted to agriculture. This follows from an assumption that agricultural production is given priority 
in the model. The industrial sector is the residual claimant on capital. 
Increases in agricultural production set into play a substantial set of countervailing forces that 
ultimately reduce it. The amount of land erosion that takes place in the model depends positively on 
both the amount of arable land and on the yield. Thus, investments that increase the amount of arable 
land and the yield produce additional erosion. Erosion permanently removes land from the model. 
Persistent pollution increases with both the amount of arable land and the amount of investment per 
hectare. Persistent pollution lowers yields, causing more investment to be used to produce the same 
amount of foods, which in turn produces additional persistent pollution that lowers yields even more. 
This is a powerful positive feedback loop and we will return to it when we look at the results of the 
model. 
$'his subtraction and the specification of the amount of capital necessary to obtain natural resources 
are crucial for one of the major sources of collapse in World3. 
%I World3, all arable land is assumed to be used for crop production. 
3.2.3. Natural ca~ital and ~ollution 
Despite its importance to the goals of the model, the treatment of nonrenewable resources and 
pollution in World3 is cursory at best. The model begins with a fixed stock of a single nonrenewable 
resource. Industrial output uses some of this output, and so every year the remaining stock of the 
nonrenewable resource falls, causing extraction costs to increase. In the model this is represented by 
making the fraction of capital that has to be devoted to obtaining resources increase as the stock of 
the resource decreases. Since, capital needed to obtain resources has priority over everything else in 
the model, the share of capital that can devoted to the other sectors of the economy must decline. In 
addition, rising population and per capita industrial production require still greater investments in 
agriculture, taking even more from the industrial sector. Since there is no ongoing technological 
change in the nonrenewable resource sector, nor any substitution between resources, this process 
causes output to collapse. 
If natural resources really grew scarcer over time, we would expect to see a long-run upward 
trend in their prices. Unfortunately for the World3 modelers, this is diametrically opposed to the 
historical record, which shows generally falling prices during the last century.'' In particular, the 
period from 1972 to 1992 was also a period of generally falling natural resource prices. One might 
have hoped that this failure of prediction, and possibly failure of understanding," would have been 
a topic of discussion in Bevond the Limits, but it was not. 
There are two types of pollution in the model, persistent pollution and air pollution. Persistent 
pollution is generated from the use of nonrenewable resources by the industrial and agricultural 
sectors. Air pollution is produced only by industrial output. Persistent pollution appears in the 
environment some years after it was generated. Nature removes some amount of persistent pollution 
each year, but, like in Wonderland, nature's ability to renew itself is assumed to diminish as the 
amount of persistent pollution grows. This forms an important positive feedback loop that also leads 
to collapse. Pollution has two effects in the model. It reduces the agriculture yield per hectare and 
it reduces life expectancy. 
'Osee Simon (1981) for a discussion of this issue. 
"There are two polar mental models of the relationship between development and the price of 
nonrenewable resources. One group, including the creators of World3 and the ecologist Paul Ehrlich 
believe that nonrenewable resources are finite and that as they get used up they must get ever more 
expensive to obtain. Another group, including Julian Simon and many other economists, note that the 
prices of nonrenewable resources have been falling for the last century. They believe that technological 
progress and the substitution of one resource for another as prices change will make the supply of 
nonrenewable resources effectively infinite. This difference of opinion led to the famous bet between 
Julian Simon and Paul Ehrlich. Simon bet that no one wuld pick four nonrenewable resources whose 
real prices would, on average, go up over a decade. In 1981, Ehrlich accepted the bet, chose four 
nonrenewable resources, and lost. Simon was wrrect; the prices of nonrenewable resources continued 
to fall. According to Simon's model, the entire natural resource segment of World3 needs to be thrown 
out and replaced with its opposite. 
3.3 The Results of the World3 Model 
The most widely remembered results of the World3 model are the mass of graphs showing 
global collapse. These graphs were coupled with statements like: "even the most optimistic estimates 
of the benefits of technology in the model did not prevent the ultimate decline of population and 
industry or in fact did not in any case postpone the collapse beyond the year 2100." The Limits t~ 
Growth left readers with three basic conclusions, but it is the first that most people remember. 
If the present growth trends in world population, industrialization, pollution, food 
production, and resource depletion continue unchanged, the limits to growth on this planet 
will be reached sometime within the next one hundred years. The most probable result 
will be a rather sudden and uncontrollable decline in both population and industrial 
capacity. (page 29)12 
It has now been twenty years since those words have been written and according to Bevond the 
Limits (1992), we have continued on the wrong course. Without change, collapse is now even closer, 
within the next eighty years. Imagine a couple who have a child this year (1992) in a developed 
country. Given projected life expectancies, that child probably would be alive at the time of the 
horrible economic, demographic, and environmental crash. If World3 is an appropriate representation 
of reality, and we continue to grow as we have been doing, then, clearly, our current standard of 
living will have been purchased at our children's expense. 
The second basic conclusion of The Limits to Growth is more optimistic. 
It is possible to alter these growth trends and to establish a condition of economic stability 
that is sustainable far into the future. (page 29) 
This optimism comes tempered with some harsh conditions. The experiments that are 
sustainable show that growth in industrial output and food per capita must come to a halt by the first 
decade of the next century and that population growth must stop soon thereafter. This seems 
inconsistent with the alleviation of poverty in the third world. In any event, sustaining even a fixed 
population with a constant per capita income is impossible in World3. There are three sources of 
inevitable crash: (1) the erosion of farm land, (2) the diminishing stock of natural resources, and (3) 
the increasing amount of pollution. The World3 model always collapses, if not before 2100 then, 
certainly, afterward. 
Economics got the title "the dismal science" because Malthusian models predicted that population 
growth would wipe out all productivity gains and keep people at a subsistence standard of living. 
World3 goes one step beyond Malthus, bringing us face to face with the nightmare of impending 
"sudden and uncontrollable decline." 
3.4. Comments on World3 
World3 is one of the most criticized models ever produced. This body of work is suddenly 
relevant again with the publication in 1992 of Bevond the LimiB. Perhaps most of it should be 
republished as well. The Limits to Growth sold m i l l i k  of copies, was studied and criticized by 
many modeling groups around the world, but it led to virtually no further developments, even by 
members of the original team. To understand the present state of sustainable development modeling, 
it is important to understand the unproductivity of the World3 approach. 
'The page numbers for The Limits to Growth refer to the Signet (New York) paperback edition. 
It could be argued that World3 has been Fruitful as a tool for persuasion, rather than as a base 
for further sustainable development modeling. Certainly, there is an element of truth to that. World3 
was definitely designed to be an effective vehicle for communicating a vision of the future to people, 
but, as the quotation from Dvnarnics of Growth in a Finite World at the beginning of this section 
indicates, the creators of World3 also had a vision of how the scientific dialogue would unfold. 
Critics of World3 would present alternative simulations; the authors of World3, or perhaps others, 
would respond and then, round after round, ever better world and local models would result. But this 
vision never materialized. 
We have already encountered the key to understanding the barrenness of World3 in Wonderland. 
Actually, World3 and Wonderland are much more similar than might appear at first glance. In 
Wonderland, it was not always so easy to know on which side of the looking glass we stood. A slight 
change of a number here or there and the model could easily go from collapse to prosperity and back 
again. Even the pathways on both sides of the looking glass appeared very similar. While the 
creators of World3 told their audience that virtually every path that entailed future economic and 
population growth led to destruction, they immediately1' - and soon thereafter, most of the interested 
modeling groups around the world1' - found many paths that did not. It turns out that World3, just 
like Wonderland, is extremely sensitive to its parameters and particularly its assumptions about the 
nature ,of technical change. Gently nudge a parameter here or tweak one over there and collapses give 
way to continued growth. Thus World3 contains many visions, some gruesome and some gentle, 
depending on figures no one can know with assuran~e.'~ 
By 1973, the community of modelers had already learned the basic story line. World3 and 
models like it could be made to produce continued growth or collapse depending on assumptions about 
unknown, and possibly, unknowable parameters. Without substantial improvement in our knowledge 
of the underlying relationships needed to build a global model of sustainable development, further 
development of World3 was, in 1973, and still remains a Fruitless exercise.16 This is why modelers 
never built on the World3 foundation. They already knew what would happen if they tried. 
"According to Models of Doom (1973), there was a draft of a technical report on The Limits to 
Growth that was available in September, 1972, which stated: 
As the runs presented here have shown, it is possible to pick a set of parameters which 
allow material capital and population growth to continue through the year 2100. Whether 
the policy assumptions in that set are viable or not, the assumption of finite limits would 
dictate a later decline through the same physical pressures only at higher values. 
Indeed, collapse is inevitable &I World3, even if population size and output per capita is fixed, because 
eventually all the nonrenewable reso- get used up. Still, in 1972, the authors of The Limits to 
Growth realized that whether the collapse would occur before or after 2100 depended on the parameters 
chosen. 
"See for example, Jkiodels of Doom (1973), written by a group from the Science Policy Research 
Unit of the University of Sussex. 
'This extreme sensitivity to parameters and initial conditions is now a staple of the literature on 
chaos. See, for example, Gleick (1987). Researchers are now more aware of this problem than they 
were when the original World3 model was written. 
'The World3 model is not disaggregated into countries or regions. Any future work on global 
sustainable development modeling will certainly need a substantial amount of such disaggregation. For 
an example of the importance of this, see Lutz (1992). 
The collapse of World3 in 1973 was disruptive to the process of environmental modeling. It 
did teach us, though, that what was needed was not another model with uncertain parameters and 
stylized equations, but, instead, models of particular places or regions where the equations could be 
specified with more confidence and made more robust to uncertain parameters. 
There's that couple arguing again. The crowd's gone. Let's walk over and listen. 
ECOLOGIST: "I admit that you are right about the flaws in the model, but it still shows how 
a system can collapse. Systems CAN collapse and the sooner people learn that the better; then 
perhaps they would do something about it." 
ECONOMIST: "Systems don't just collapse, particularly the entire Earth. If there are problems 
they would show up in some place first. If the price of some raw material rises, people will conserve 
on its use and substitute toward some cheaper material. If farm land becomes degraded, it won't 
become degraded everywhere in the world all at once. The first signs of a problem will gives us time 
to work up a solution. Anyway, show me a concrete example of a collapse." 
He points to a little bridge and they go off. The sign by the bridge says "The Sahel." Let's 
follow them. 
4. THE SOCIOMAD MODEL O F  THE SAHEL 
7his study is the first time the tragedy-of-the-commons syndrome has been treated in 
an explicit interacting ecological-social-economicframework. Picardi (1974) p. 16 
4.1. Introduction 
In 1974, Anthony Picardi, then a graduate student in the Department of Civil Engineering at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), wrote a dissertation that included, to our knowledge, 
the first simulation model of sustainable development applied on a less than global scale. It was 
devoted to a study of the portion of the Sahel found in the Tahoua region of Niger and was funded 
by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) for the United Nations, as part 
of a larger project. Unfortunately, Picardi's thesis was never published." Picardi remembers the 
response it received: 
USAID didn't want our study published. They gave us money to print only a half dozen 
copies. They forbid (sic) MIT to publish it with Institute funds and refused to send it to 
the USAID field offices in Africa. 
There were several reasons given, some obviously false. My personal opinion is that they 
wanted a study that recommended a quick fix. Preferably something high-tech that U.S. 
businesses could supply. Cattle breeding technology or the use of satellites, maybe. 
"We obtained a copy of his thesis by writing to Dr. Anthony C. Picardi, 58 Washbum Avenue, 
Wellesley, Massachusetts, 02181, USA. We obtained this address from Bamey et al. (1991). 
The message of SAHEL18 is that there is no quick, technical fix. The problems in the 
Sahel are all interconnected in a complex socio-politicalecological system. The only 
solutions are long-term.. . That wasn't what USAID or the UN wanted to hear.19 
Although it was never published, Picardi's thesis deserves recognition as one of the best 
simulation studies of sustainable development ever written, and certainly as a fundamental piece of 
work in the area. One of the most compelling (and chilling) aspects of Picardi's work is its focus on 
a real economic and environmental crash. In the drought of the early 1970s, thousands of people 
died, further thousands were turned into environmental refugees, and the loss of grazing animals -- 
the major form of productive capital in the area - to dehydration and starvation was substantial. In 
addition, the process of desertification sped up. Environmental crashes do occur and in creating a 
model of one, Picardi sharpens our understanding both of how such crises happen and how they can 
be prevented. To date, Picardi's model is the only one we know of that deals with an observed crash. 
The area chosen for study lies in the western portion of Niger on the border with Mali. It 
contains areas that would be more formally classified as subdesert and areas that would more properly 
be called sahel. For simplicity, following Picardi, we will call the entire area sahel. Rainfall in the 
study area varies from an annual average of around 100 mrn per year in the north to 650 mm per year 
in the south. Picardi calls the area the Tahoua study area, because it includes most of the Tahoua 
administrative area. The region, which is about the size of the U.S. state of Kentucky, was chosen 
because of the availability of data and because there was a single dominant form of economic activity, 
livestock raising. The dominant lifestyle there is nomadic. 
The nomads of the Sahel live a precarious existence. They raise animals for food, milk, 
transport, and for sale. Rain is often scare and usually very unevenly distributed. Herds are moved 
from place to place depending on the rainfall and vegetation growth. Most of the area is a gigantic 
common grazing field without clearly defined property rights. In periods of good rainfall, populations 
of people and animals build up, the animals overgraze the land, the land deteriorates and this produces 
a situation ripe for the next collapse. What have been the effects of past policies on this cycle? What 
are the possibilities of success of future interventions? To answer these questions, we need a 
simulation model. 
4.2. The SOCIOMAD Model of the Sahel 
Picardi's thesis contains three successively more complex models called, from simplest to most 
inclusive, SAHEL2, ECNOMAD3, and SOCIOMAD.P SAHEL2, the underlying ecological model, 
deals with the relationship between the quality of rangeland, the size of herds, and the length of 
periods of migration into the Sahel from areas outside the region, among other things. Rainfall, the 
quality of rangeland, and government policies constrain what the nomads can do. What they will do, 
'The name SAHEL was, apparently, given to the model in Meadows and Robinson (1985). Picardi 
called his most complete model SOCIOMAD. We will return to a conjectural discussion of this name 
below. 
19As quoted in Barney et al. (1991) p. 193. 
T o  some, the model's name, SOCIOMAD, may conjure up visions of sociology gone mad. We do 
not know Picardi's views of sociology, but it is appropriate to point out that SOCIOMAD evolved from 
ECNOMAD3 and that both are models of nomadism. ECNOMAD3 could be read either as EC- 
NOMAD-3 or ECNO-MAD-3. Similarly, SOCIOMAD can be read as SOCI-OMAD or SOCIO-MAD. 
in terms of variables such as their number of children ever born, the animal slaughter rate, and 
amount of capital held in non-animal form, depends not only on what nature and the government will 
allow them to do, but on their preferences as well. ECNOMAD3 adds those preferences to the 
SAHEL2 model. The result is a framework in which the behavior of the nomads is responsive to their 
environment and to government policies. As in most economic models, preferences in ECNOMAD3 
are assumed to be fixed. SOCIOMAD goes one step further and explicitly specifies the process by 
which preferences change with experience and because of various government programs. 
Picardi learned systems analysis from Jay Forrester at MIT and so, in a sense, World3 and 
SOCIOMAD are related. Forrester's emphasis on clear and complete documentation also can be seen 
in Picardi's work. All the equations of SOCIOMAD appear in an appendix to his dissertation (in the 
Dynamo programming language) with clear verbal descriptions of how they were parameterized. The 
model is 110 equations (and tables) long. It would not be difficult to translate it from Dynamo into 
another language and run it on a personal computer." 
4.2.1. m e  economic sement  
In the Sahel, the main resources are water and rangeland. Rainfall is exogenous in the model, 
and the quality of the rangeland in any period depends on the amount of rainfall, on the forage 
utilization intensity during that period, and on the quality of the rangeland in the previous period. The 
forage utilization intensity depends on the number of animals grazed on the land, the amount of land 
available for grazing, and the duration of migratory periods, among other things. Once the sustainable 
level of forage utilization is exceeded, the soil begins to deteriorate. The sustainable level of forage 
utilization of degraded soils is even less, so a constant high level of forage utilization causes an 
accelerating decline in soil quality, ending either in desertification of the land or massive livestock die 
off. This is the dominant positive feedback loop in the model. Land regeneration is included in the 
model, but it happens at a much slower rate than does degeneration. 
There are two populations in the model, the population of livestock and the population of people. 
The population of animals is given quite a sophisticated treatment. There are birth rates and death 
rates that depend on the amount of forage available. Besides the factors mentioned above, the amount 
of forage depends on the extent that water is available from wells. Improvements in veterinary 
services reduce the livestock death rate, but, of course, the more crucial determinant of that rate is 
the size of the human population. 
In the model, humans use the livestock for four different purposes: (I)  for meat, (2) for milk, 
(3) for sale, so that other goods can be purchased, and (4) for what Picardi calls "social 
infrastructure." This latter category includes the use of animals for gifts, bridewealth, establishing 
social ties, transport, and drought and disease insurance. 
The allocation of the herd for these four purposes is computed using the prices of animals, 
millet, and milk, and a set of desired al locat i~ns.~ Desired milk calories per person day and desired 
marketed food calories per person day are assumed to be constant. Desired wealth is allowed to vary 
over time depending on a wealth target that can be influenced by public policies and actual wealth. 
"To our knowledge, there is no Dynamo compiler for personal computers. 
?he procedure used to compute the allocations is not one with which economists would generally 
agree. According to it, the marginal utility of a specific allocation for a particular purpose depends upon 
the ratio of the specific allocation for that purpose to some desired allocation. When ratios of marginal 
utilities become unequal, slow adjustments are made in the allocations. 
Desired herd use for social infrastructure depends on a socially determined "normal" infrastructure 
herd and a food deficit function that reflects experiences with food deficiencies. The nomads also 
determine how long each migratory period in the Sahel will be and the herd slaughter rate. If the herd 
grows too large and degrades the rangeland, less forage will grow and both the human and animal 
populations will suffer. 
4.2.2. The demogra~hic sector 
In the SOCIOMAD model, people are born, die, and migrate.P The age structure of the 
population does not explicitly appear, but approximate age structure effects are included in some 
demographic equations. For example, the crude birth rate is assumed to depend on the fraction of 
women in the reproductive ages (an age structure variable), per capita wealth, and a lagged value of 
life expectancy. The fraction of women in the reproductive age in a given period is approximated 
using that period's value of life expectancy. The crude death rate also depends on the value of life 
expectancy, which, now, is used as a proxy for both the underlying age-specific death rates and the 
age structure. Life expectancy, in turn, tends to increase over time, but is influenced by availability 
of food. The net out-migration rate depends on a smoothed value of the ratio of available food to 
required food. 
4.2.3. Natural ca~ital and ~ollution 
Pollution, per se, does not exist in the SOCIOMAD model and there are no nonrenewable 
resources. Natural capital is represented by the quality of the rangeland. Like in Wonderland and 
World3, nature in the SOCIOMAD model has the power to undo some or all the damage done by 
human or animal sources, and this power is assumed to wane as the damage increases. Thus 
SOCIOMAD includes only one of the three sources of collapse built into World3. Apparently, it was 
enough. 
4.2.4. Policv variables 
SOCIOMAD is rich in its array of policy variables. This is one strength of the model. Among 
the policy variables are: (1) welldigging to increase the amount of land over which the nomads can 
graze, (2) veterinary interventions to reduce livestock death rates, (3) food relief for people in bad 
times, (4) changes in the prices of animals due to government policies, (5) supplemental livestock 
feeding programs, (6) taxes based on herd size, and (7) a set of range management policies. 
4.3. Results of the SOCIOMAD Model 
Picardi's discussions of the effects of past and potential future policy interventions are extensive 
and rich in detail. In the space available, we can provide only a brief glimpse of them. Picardi used 
the SAHEL2 model to run historical experiments with a starting date of 1920. One question addressed 
was whether the severity of the crash of the early 1970s was due to the severity of the drought. The 
answer is that it was not. The severity of the drought of the 1970s was not unprecedented.% The 
simulations showed that the drought determined the timing of the crash, but not whether there would 
be one. If the crash did not occur in the early seventies, it would have occurred later when the next 
%s is the only model considered here that allows migration. 
?''he drought in the early seventies was not exceptionally severe by historical standards. Picardi 
presented evidence suggesting that a similar period of drought occurred twice before in the twentieth 
century, roughly at 30 year intervals. 
drought came. The root cause of the severity of the crash was not the severity of the drought, but the 
cumulative effects of excess grazing brought about by a prior period of unusually good rainfall and 
other factors. 
Simulations were also used to assess the impacts of three historically significant interventions: 
(1) welldigging, (2) improved veterinary care, and (3) improved public health conditions. Picardi 
accomplished this by running the model with the historically observed interventions and without 
them.s In the hypothetical scenario, welldigging was assumed to stay at a low level. This had two 
consequences in the model; the proportion of the land area available for grazing was reduced, as was 
the duration of migratory stays in the Sahel. In addition, veterinary interventions were assumed not 
to have taken place (the stock death rate remained at its pre-1930s level), and public health 
interventions were presumed not to have occurred (human life expectancy remained at its pre-1930s 
level). The outcome of this experiment is striking. The interventions worsened the effects of the 
drought and increased the loss of human life. In the period after the drought, population size is higher 
in the Sahel in the no intervention scenario, than in the observed case because, in the former, the 
population approached the carrying capacity of the land at a slower rate of growth, leading to less 
overshooting, less land deterioration, and a higher long-run soil quality. 
In a forward looking analysis, Picardi goes one step further and uses the SOCIOMAD model 
to ask what would happen if the three interventions listed above, after having occurred, were slowly 
reversed, so that by 2020 the Sahel returned to the conditions observed in the 1920s. The answer is 
that, in this "complete neglect" scenario, human and animal populations were higher than in the case 
where the interventions were maintained and, further, there was less desertification. One could hardly 
recommend a policy of increasing death rates, but, in the model, decreasing current population growth 
rates leads to fewer future deaths due to drought induced calamities. The indicated policy, then, is 
one in which the population growth rate is reduced by decreasing the birth rate, although, as we shall 
see below, Picardi is not optimistic about this. 
Picardi considers some other polices, including raising the real price of cattle, increasing the 
preference for non-animal wealth holding, increasing taxes on animals, and limiting the amount of 
time nomads spend in the Sahel. The results of all of these are dismaying - land degradation, 
starvation, and out-migration. The reason is that the land remains a common property, whose services 
are free to the nomads. Picardi finds that the only policies that have a possibility of succeeding are 
those that regulate the numbers of animals maintained on the land according to the condition of the 
soil. He argues that this sort of regulation would not likely be obtained voluntarily from the nomads 
and probably would require the imposition of some kind of outside authority. 
To simulate what this outside authority might do, an experiment was created in which the herd 
size is varied year by year so that the size of the herd to be carried over the dry season plus expected 
additions to the herd would not exceed the prior season's sustained carrying capacity. This scenario 
was much more optimistic for land quality, but the annual required slaughter rates varied enormously, 
sometimes leading to massive herd reductions followed by human starvation and waves of 
out-migration. These fluctuations could be eliminated through a supplemental feeding program, where 
herd sizes were related to the long-run state of land quality, but other simulations show that these 
programs could, sometimes, be more costly than the value of all the stock ~ l a u g h t e r e d . ~ ~  
Qose experiments used the actual rainfall from the early 1920s through the early 1970s and a 
random pattern thereafter. 
26All the cost figures are discounted. Picardi's thesis contains an interesting discussion of the 
importance of the outside agency having a low rate of discount. 
A combination of policies that include direct stock control, supplementary feeding, veterinary 
interventions to reduce stock death rates, and education that increases material aspirations would have 
the effect of increasing incomes and decreasing desertification over the long-run. When health, 
nutrition, and family planning interventions are added as a package to this optimistic simulation, 
matters get worse. The range still improves in quality, but incomes per capita are not nearly as high 
because of the increased population size. The increased population size is due, in part, to an 
assessment that family planning can play only a limited role in reducing fertility among the nomadic 
people of the Sahel. In the simulations, the introduction of a family planning program only reduces 
the prior fertility level by ten percent, a very modest amount. It would have been interesting to see 
what effect a larger reduction would have had. 
4.4. Comments 
The sorts of economic and demographic crashes feared by ecologists do occur and the history 
of the Sahel region provides us with dramatic case studies. Picardi's choice of the Sahel as the setting 
for his sustainable development simulation models was inspired. The results show the power of 
systems dynamics methodology - as it was in the early 1970s - for understanding the 
interrelationships between economic, demographic, and environmental concerns. In retrospect, it is 
a great shame that Picardi's thesis was never published and that it has not served as a point of 
departure for other models. 
The Sahel is the vision of the early Malthus manifested on Earth, but with an additional dismal 
twist. In Malthus' early writings, whenever there were productivity improvements, populations tended 
to grow until subsistence level wages were reestablished. The mechanism that stopped the population 
growth was what Malthus called the "positive check" - famine, disease, and warfare. All three 
elements appear prominently in the recent history of events in the Sahel and areas immediately to the 
south. In the Malthusian view, there was an equilibrium to which the economicdemographic system 
kept returning. In Picardi's models, and probably in the Sahel itself, matters are more complex. The 
three elements stressed in The Limits to Growth - growth, overshoot, and collapse - all play crucial 
roles. 
In the Sahel, when there is a period of good rains or when there is progress in keeping livestock 
or humans alive, the population begins to grow and this growth builds up a certain rn~mentum.~ 
In this situation, a drought could trigger a collapse that does not return the system to some stable 
equilibrium point. The overshooting that happens, when the drought comes and people try desperately 
to maintain their herds and themselves, can cause damage to the environment that can only be repaired 
over a long period. Thus the collapse of a rapidly growing population does not return the system to 
the same equilibrium that is reached when a more slowly growing population crashes, as we saw from 
Picardi's historical simulations: The collapse of a more rapidly growing population leads to a worse 
situation. Interventions to help the nomads after the 1930s left them worse off after the drought of 
the early 1970s than they would have been without those interventions. 
The extra dismal element that Malthus did not foresee was that there is a relationship between 
how the positive check works, the rate of growtb of economies and populations, and the local 
equilibrium that the system can attain. If death rates rise slowly as a system reaches its limits, and 
population and economic growth rates slow down gradually before the crash, the damage could be 
reduced. If death rates, and economic and population growth rates do not decline before the crash, 
l f  Picardi had included the age structure in his model he would have captured the effects of 
demographic momentum. This would have added an additional interesting dimension to the model. 
as in SOCIOMAD, World3 and Wonderland, there is the possibility of more damage and a lower local 
equilibrium. Indeed, successively lower equilibria could be attained in this process. 
In arguing in favor of lowering population growth rates, many people cite the role of slower 
population growth in postponing crises. Picardi's work emphasizes another advantage. If a crisis does 
occur, less damage is likely to result if the system as a whole has less momentum. 
In the Sahel, the environmental crisis was caused by the existence of a crucial common property 
resource, grazing land. Day after day, Hardin's vision of the "tragedy of the commons" gets played 
out in the Sahel with predictable consequences. In theory, there are several ways of dealing with 
common property resources. One is to privatize the common property, but this is impossible in the 
Sahel. Although it is possible to sell parts of the land, this would not be a solution to the nomads' 
economic problems. Rains are very spotty. Any given fixed parcel of land may or may not get 
rainfall. The advantage of nomadism is that people and herds can be move to those random places 
where rainfall has occurred. Government management of the common property is another approach. 
This requires a government that has a strong preference for the future over the present, is relatively 
free of corruption, understands the long-run relationship between a set of characteristics of soil 
condition and the appropriate aggregate number of animals that should be allowed to graze, has the 
monetary resources to fund a supplementary livestock feeding program, and has the means to enforce 
its decisions. Such a set of characteristics is difficult to find in any of the region's governments. 
The difficulty of finding an easy solution to the problems of the Sahel is one of the chief 
conclusions of the Picardi models. Perhaps the next generation of models needs to broaden the system 
boundaries. Could the problems be addressed more appropriately in a model that also included the 
greener areas farther to the Then, policies might be able to be designed that allow for 
continuous migration out of a small Sahelian population. 
The Earth's atmosphere is like the rangeland of the Sahel. It is a common resource that cannot 
be privatized or easily controlled by any single governmental agency. But we cannot solve the 
environmental problems of the Earth's atmosphere by widening system boundaries. It must be done 
from within the system itself. If we cannot avoid collapse in the Sahel from within the system, can 
we avoid it elsewhere where similar common property problems arise? 
For sustainable development modeling, common property problems are especially crucial because 
they can produce strong positive feedback loops that can cause crashes. In Mauritius, the main 
common property problems relate to water use. When we get there, we will see that they have been 
treated in great detail. 
Directly in front of us now, stands that couple again, arguing as usual, and looking somewhat 
bedraggled for having spent so long in this dry and dusty part of the world. 
ECONOMIST: "Don't you owe me some money?" 
ECOLOGIST: "What are you talking about?" 
excellent choice of settings for future work in this area would be the Sudan. In Northern Sudan, 
the pressures of increasing human and animal populations has been causing increased desertification. As 
a consequence, nomadic people have been pushed southward causing inter-tribal warfare. A model of 
the Sudan, then, could weigh the costs of such environmentally caused conflicts against the cost of 
policies which could avoid them. 
"Don't you remember the bet we made about the prices of nonrenewable resources? You said 
that nonrenewable resources were finite and therefore, as we ran out of them, they would cost more 
and we bet on it." 
"Yes, I remember," he said glumly, writing her a check for $10,000. "But that doesn't mean 
that economic and ecological structures can't collapse. Look around you. Here is a terrible crash. 
People are suffering and dying and you keep saying that economies can't crash. Why don't you open 
your eyes to reality?" 
"Of course, the economy collapsed," she said. "What did you expect? It's a one sector 
economy based on a common resource that is unpriced and uncontrolled. There is no possibility of 
substituting land for anything else, and no technological progress in the number of these shrubs the 
land can produce. I answered a question about this sort of situation in a prelim I took in grad school." 
"You knew all about crashes?" he asked with astonishment. "You knew all about crashes from 
graduate school and you've argued with me all this time that crashes can't happen. "I can't believe 
it!" he added looking at the heavens. "What's going on here?" 
"It's not so difficult," she said. "In a complex economy, where prices play their role in 
allocating resources, where substitution is possible, and technological progress accumulates from small 
changes in a wide variety of processes, negative feedback loops dominate and, in the aggregate, the 
behavior of the system is smooth and reasonably predictable. This is how I won the bet with you. 
The Sahel is a case of a single sector economy based on a common resource with no prices and few 
substitution possibilities. " 
"All right," he said, "where markets function well we do not have to be so worried about 
collapse, but look around you; the market doesn't always function well and can't always be made to 
function well. What do we do in these cases? Say that the Sahel does not fit our textbook models 
and walk away." 
"Give me another example of a case of a complex economy where an unpriced common resource 
plays a crucial role," she asked. 
"That's easy," he replied, "the place is the Earth, and the unpriced common resource is the air." 
"Speaking of air," she said, "isn't it awfully hot here? What's over there?" 
It's a small bridge and a sign that reads "Costa Rica." Immediately they begin walking in that 
direction. Let's follow them. 
5. POMA - INTERACTIVE MODEL O F  POPULATION AND ENVIRONMENT 
IN COSI'A RICA, 1990 
5.1. Introduction 
The POMAZ9 model is devoted to the consideration of the relationship between population and 
the environment with special emphasis on Costa Rica's central valley. It is the result of a 
collaboration between the Asociaci6n DemogrAfica Costarricense and the RAPID 111 project, funded 
by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). RAPID is an acronym for 
Resources for the Awareness of Population Impacts on Development and three RAPID projects funded 
by USAID have been producing models of the effects of population growth on development since the 
early 1970s. Thus, in contrast with World3 and SOCIOMAD, the RAPID models have been 
developing over a period of two decades now. To our knowledge, there does not exist any other 
continuous program of model development in the population area with a longer history. 
From the beginning of the RAPID program, the objective of the models has been presentational. 
In other words, the models were designed to demonstrate negative effects of population growth to 
policy makers, to motivate them to spend more resources on programs to reduce fertility. Because 
of this objective, RAPID models tend to be highly simplified in comparison with more scientifically 
oriented ones. The POMA model is no exception. Although it contains economic, demographic, and 
environmental variables, it is not a model of sustainable development, because it does not permit 
intergenerational welfare or income comparisons. 
5.2. The POMA Model 
5.2.1. The economic sement 
Real income per capita is assumed to grow at a fixed percentage rate per year over the projection 
period, which is from 1985 to 2025 for both Costa Rica as a whole and the central valley and is from 
1975 to 2025 for the metropolitan area of San Josb. The fixed percentage rate of growth is assumed 
not to vary over time, over region, or be influenced by the rate of population growth or by the effects 
of any sort of pollution. Thus, the model cannot answer questions about the effects of population 
growth or environmental degradation on per capita income growth. Indeed, the POMA model has no 
positive or negative feedback loops at all. 
The lack of any feedback mechanisms from pollution and environmental degradation to economic 
growth is extremely unfortunate in the Costa Rican case, because there is evidence that those 
feedbacks are significant (see Box 9). Even within its own terms of reference, the POMA model 
would have been significantly improved by including and analyzing them. 
5.2.2. The demogra~hic semen1 
The POMA model has at its core a standard (cohort components) population projection module. 
Populations are projected for Costa Rica as a whole, the central valley of Costa Rica, and the San Josb 
metropolitan area." The projections take as inputs the time paths of two sorts of variables, life 
9 O M A  stands for Poblacion y Medio Ambiente. 
"San Jod lies within the central valley. 
Box 9: Environmental and Economic Interactions in Costa Rica 
expectancies at birth by sex, and total fertility rates." Life expectancy improvements are assumed 
to be exogenous, and therefore unaffected by pollution or income changes. Two paths of total fertility 
rate are chosen. One maintains the total fertility rate at is 1980-85 level and the other allows the total 
fertility rate to fall slowly to 2.21 in 2020-25. 
The authors of the POMA model did not have any life expectancy or total fertility rate data 
except for the country as a whole, so, in lieu of a more convincing idea, they assumed that the levels 
and time paths of life expectancies and total fertility rates would be the same in all three regions. 
Thus, the total fertility rate is supposed to be the identical in San Jose and in Costa Rica as a whole, 
although we know that urban fertility is likely to be lower than rural fertility?' In addition, the 
POMA model assumes that there is no net migration between San Jose and any other part of the 
country, and between the central valley and any other part of the country. All these assumptions are 
highly questionable and their correspondence to the reality that they are supposed to represent is 
dubious. 
In any event, under the low fertility assumption Costa Rica's population grows by 97 percent 
in the 40 year period from 1985 to 2025, or at an average annual rate of 1.7 percent. Under the high 
fertility assumption, the population would grow by 152 percent in the 40 year period, or at an average 
annual rate of 2.3 percent. If pollution per person were constant, going from the high scenario to the 
low one would reduce the increase in pollution from 152 percent to 92 percent. Of course, if Costa 
3'The total fertility rate is the average number of live births a woman would have over her lifetime, 
given the observed fertility behavior of a given period. 
'5 1984-90, Costa Rica's population was 52 percent urban. See Arcia ef al. (1991) p. 17. 
Rica wanted to reduce pollution rather than accept a large increase, other steps in addition to the 
reduction in fertility would be r e q ~ i r e d . ~  
5.2.3. The natural c-pent 
Most of the POMA model is designed to look at the effects of population growth on various 
forms of environmental degradation. These are: (1) air quality reductions due to automotive 
emissions, (2) increases in the production of solid wastes, (3) deforestation, and (4) the encroachment 
of urban areas on the use of land for agriculture and forests. 
Air quality is considered in terms of amounts of: (1) sulfur dioxide, (2) carbon monoxide, (3) 
nitrogen oxides, (4) suspended particulates, and (5) hydrocarbons contributed by vehicles to the air 
of San Jose. From the population projection, we know the future population of San Jose at five year 
intervals from 1985 through 2025. Three time paths are given for the ratio of people to vehicles. In 
the first, it remains constant at 7.1. In the second, it falls to 5.0 in 2025, and, in the third, it falls 
more rapidly, to 4.2 in 2025. Roughly speaking, we can think of each of these paths referring to a 
different rate of per capita income growth in San Jose. The faster the rate of economic growth the 
faster the ratio of people to vehicles is expected to fall. 
For each fertility path, there are three paths of the ratio of people to vehicles, making for six 
possible combinations. For any given combination, the number of vehicles in each year in San Jose 
can be easily computed. Since each vehicle is assumed to produce a fixed amount of each of those 
five pollutants, the amount of each pollutant contributed by the vehicles also may be easily 
calculated." The implicit assumption here is that vehicles will not become less polluting over time 
and that less polluting fuels will not be formulated or, at least, that if there are less polluting vehicles 
and fuels they will not be used in Costa Rica. All possible policies with regard to vehicular emissions 
are ignored. 
Analogously, three exogenous time paths of the amount of solid waste per personday are given. 
One remains constant at 0.677 kilograms per personday. The second rises from 0.677 kilograms per 
personday in 1990 to 0.900 in 2025, and the third from 0.677 to 1.200. When we multiply the 
amount of solid waste per personday by the number of persondays from the population projection, 
we obtain the amount of solid waste. Given the time path of solid waste per personday, the more 
people, the more waste. All possible policies with respect to recycling and other ways of dealing with 
solid waste production are ignored. 
331f per capita income grew at 3 percent per year for 40 years and population size remained constant, 
total output would grow by 226 percent. If pollution per unit of output remained fixed, pollution would 
also increase by 226 percent. Now let us add population growth to the story. Under the high scenario, 
population would grow by 152 percent over the 40 year period. Putting the two together (i.e. population 
growth and economic growth) would result in an increase of 722 percent in pollution. This large increase 
in pollution can be attacked in two ways: (1) population policies, which reduce fertility, and (2) 
environmental policies, which reduce the amount of pollution per unit of output. If better population 
policies could cause the growth of population to be reduced from 152 percent to 92 percent, the level of 
pollution would grow by 526 percent instead of 722 percent. Better population policies may be able to 
reduce the amount of pollution increase, but environmental policies are needed, in addition, if significant 
increases in pollution are not to oecur. A more detailed discussion of this sort of computation along with 
its application to selected Asian countries can be found in Sanderson and Tan (1992), chapter 8. 
%e model is slightly more complicated because it separates out diesel and gasoline powered 
vehicles. 
Deforestation is studied in two ways: (1) directly, using a three-step process, and (2) indirectly, 
under the rubric of land use. The first step in the direct procedure is to determine per capita demand 
for processed wood. An ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was run on data from 1970-1989 
with the per capita consumption of wood as the dependent variable and population size and the price 
of wood as the independent variables. Per capita income and government foreign trade polices were 
assumed to have no effect on the demand for wood. Based on this equation, an assumption about what 
the future price of wood might be, and other adjustments, two time profiles of wood consumption per 
capita were produced, one for the higher fertility scenario and one for the lower fertility scenario. 
Multiplying wood consumption per capita by the number of people produces the total amount of wood 
consumed. 
The second step is to translate cubic meters of wood consumed to hectares of forest cut down. 
Two possibilities are considered, a more efficient one, where fewer hectares of forest are harvested 
per cubic meter of wood produced and a less efficient one, where more hectares are used. 
Multiplying the number of hectares harvested per cubic meter of wood produced by the number of 
cubic meters demanded, the authors obtain the number of hectares that must be cut down to meet that 
demand. 
In the third step, the amount of commercial forest remaining is computed. Since it is assumed 
that there is no replanting of commercial forests, the number of hectares of commercial forest at time 
r + l  is just the number of hectares at time t minus the number of hectares harvested. If the inefficient 
technology is used, the commercial forests of Costa Rica are wiped out by 2003, in the high fertility 
case, and by 2004, in the low fertility case. Given the more efficient technology, the entire 
commercial forests of Costa Rica are wiped out by the year 2013, no matter which fertility assumption 
is used. Apparently, better governmental policies toward commercial forestry are urgently needed. 
Land use in the central valley is determined using a set of four equations. In the first, the 
amount of urban land used in a given year is assumed to depend on the population of the central valley 
in that year, and on past values of income per capita and municipal infrastructure costs. In the 
second, municipal infrastructure costs in a given year depend on the current population and the past 
amount of urban land used. In the third, agricultural land is assumed to decrease as urban land grows, 
and, in the last equation, forest land is assumed to decrease as agricultural land shrinks. 
This analysis predicts a substantial decline in the remaining forest land in the central valley by 
the year 2025. If these computations are consistent with the ones on deforestation, we must assume 
that the remaining forests are not commercial ones. 
5.3. Comments 
As expected, increases in population size always cause increases in pollution. This conclusion 
is built into the model. 
An important problem with RAPID models, like this one, is that they tend to avoid consideration 
of all possible governmental policy responses to a growing population. This is, of course, their 
nature. The models are designed to spread awareness of problems associated with population growth, 
and to suggest that slowing fertility is the only answer to them. A presentation of alternative policies 
would be contrary to the mission of the RAPID project. 
There's a RAPID presentation of the POMA model just ending over there. ECOLOGIST and 
ECONOMIST get up and start discussing what they have just seen. 
"Wasn't that fun," he said. "I hope that really gets their attention. I like the color graphics on 
the screen." 
"Fun," she said. "That wasn't fun; that was dreadful. How could they treat population policy 
as the only policy in the entire world that can be used against pollution? Even their own figures show 
how ridiculous that is. There is no population policy that can save their commercial forests. Saving 
their commercial forests will require other sorts of policies. Probably each of the effects they showed 
could be completely eliminated by using up-todate technology already in use in a dozen countries. 
Why do you support such biased work?" 
"Because," he replied, "it gets people's attention. Then maybe they'll do something about 
pollution and about population growth." 
"Look," she said, "we've agreed that in some parts of the economic system markets work.. . " 
"Yes," he interrupted, "that little bit of wisdom cost me $10,000. And we've also agreed that 
crashes can happen and have really happened." 
"Yes," she said, "but mainly in cases with important unpriced and uncontrolled common 
property resources. But then shouldn't you also agree to stop supporting this one-sided form of 
modeling where only one set of policies is explored. Wouldn't it be better if we got people's attention 
by giving them the whole story and telling them about population options, environmental options, and 
technological options instead of pretending that one or another set didn't exist?" 
"Of course, for scientific work it's better to have models that include all the options," he said, 
"but I've never seen a model that did that." 
"What's over there," she asked as she pointed to her right. 
"It looks like another bridge," he said. "The sign says 'Mauritius'. Do you want to try it?" 
They're walking toward the bridge. Let's follow them. 
6. THE MAURITIUS MODEL 
6.1. Introduction 
While the last two decades produced a lively and rapidly growing literature on the 
interrelationships between economic, demographic, and environmental variables,= the development 
of simulation models that included these three factors almost came to a complete halt, after the burst 
of activity in the early seventies. Meadows et d. (1992) presents virtually the same World3 model 
that appeared in Meadows et d. (1972). This lack of progress in the formulation and testing of the 
World3 model, even by its own authors, is representative of the moribund state of the literature in the 
last two decades. 
In the early 1990s, some people at IIASA grew uncomfortable with this state of affairs. They 
believed that researchers could learn a great deal about the relationship between the environment and 
development, in general, by studying it in specific settings. It is that belief that motivated the creation 
of the Mauritius model. 
From the beginning, the Mauritius modeling project had three goals: (1) to help Mauritian 
decision-makers formulate sustainable development policies, (2) to address specific questions in the 
literature and to show how they could be answered in the context of Mauritius, and (3) to provide a 
first step in the process of reinvigorating the subject of sustainable development modeling. The 
Mauritius model will not, by itself, provide answers to general questions, but it does provide answers 
to particular questions. If other studies follow and more answers are found to specific questions, 
eventually the field will be in a stronger position to address the more general ones. 
In order meet its objectives the Mauritius modeling team: (1) avoided the nebulous relationships 
found in World3, where small changes in parameters cause entirely different outcomes, (2) put 
substantial emphasis on common property problems, as suggested by the SOCIOMAD model of the 
Sahel,M and (3) avoided the sort of prejudgment about the importance of various factors, seen in the 
POMA model, by including specific economic, demographic, and environmental policies. As we will 
see below, a strength of the Mauritius model is the detail with which policy alternatives are 
articulated. 
6.2. The Mauritius Model in Brief 
The Mauritius model is described in detail in Section 111, so here we only present highlights of 
its structure. The model has four modules: (1) population, (2) economy, (3) land use, and (4) water 
resources. The population module produces projections of the population of Mauritius by age, sex, 
student status, and educational attainment. The Mauritius model is the only one considered here to 
incorporate education explicitly." Education is allowed to increase the productivity of labor and 
There are nearly 400 references in the bibliography of the & 
Develo~ment and the Environment (World Bank (1992)). The vast majority of these were written in the 
last two decades. Even this bibliography is hardly complete. For example, no work done by Julian 
Simon or his collaborators appears there. 
the Mauritius case, this common property resource is water. 
"SOCIOMAD incorporates policies that change people's tastes for children, animals, and wealth 
holding. To the extent that these taste changes are an important m l t  of education, the SOCIOMAD 
model can implicitly deal with educational differences. 
costs the government money to produce. This treatment of education is of crucial importance to the 
model. If people were not allowed to become more productive with education, the effect of population 
growth on per capita income growth and pollution would essentially be predetermined. The population 
module links to the land use module through the demand for urban land and to the water module 
through the water needs of the population and the consequent water pollution. 
The economic module is based on a fifteen sector input-output framework with fixed relative 
prices. It is linked to the demographic sector through labor supply and labor prod~ctivity?~ It is 
connected to the land use module through the demand for land for agricultural purposes. Because 
agricultural activities compete for land with urban development, population growth can reduce 
economic growth through the reduction of land available for farming. The economic module and the 
water module are interconnected; economic activities cause various sorts of water pollution and water 
pollution causes a diminution of the amount of water available for irrigation and a resulting decline 
in crop yields. The Mauritian economy is assumed to be open to foreign trade. Currently, its biggest 
exports are sugar and textiles. It imports oil, capital goods, and variety of consumer goods. All of 
this is captured in the model. 
Like the economic module, the land use module is connected to all the others. Land can be used 
for sugar cane growing, other agriculture, beaches, urban commercial purposes, and urban residential 
purposes. Land quality cannot degrade in the model and there is no provision for e r o ~ i o n . ~  Policy- 
makers are allowed to control the density of future urban settlements. Therefore, the model allows 
urban density adjustments to be made as future population s u e  increases. 
The water module is the model's key component for shedding light on questions of sustainable 
development. People use water and their wastes cause water pollution. Economic activity also uses 
water and causes pollution. When water gets too polluted, labor productivity falls, as the everyday 
activities of people get disrupted, and agricultural output falls because of limitations on irrigation. 
On the other hand, though water is treated as an unpriced common resource, it is not uncontrolled. 
The government can spend money on building reservoirs and on water treatment facilities of various 
sorts. Money spent on reservoirs and water treatment facilities cannot, of course, be spent on other 
things and must be obtained from taxpayers through higher tax rates. 
An unusual and very desirable feature of the Mauritius model is the great detail with which 
policy options in the water module are treated. For example, the module contains a list of possible 
reservoir sites being considered by the Mauritius water authorities, their costs, and their capacities. 
The user can specify which particular reservoirs get built in each period. Still, good reservoir sites 
are limited and water purification systems can only eliminate a certain amount of pollution from the 
water. We will not spoil the enjoyment of reading this book by giving away its ending here. The 
reader will have to wait to see how water provides limits to Mauritian growth. 
The Mauritius model is extraordinarily open. There are over 1,000 parameters that can be set 
by the user. The disadvantage of this is that the use of the model can be daunting at first. On the 
other hand, experienced users have at their disposal a flexible tool for the study of both the Mauritius 
economy and the nature of sustainable development from which much more can be learned than can 
be presented in this volume. 
%e government influences the future productivity of labor through educational expenditures. 
%e justification for these specifications can be found in Holm (forthcoming). 
7. OTHER MODELS 
Space and time have severely limited the number of models that could be reviewed here. The 
first model we sought for this review was the ECCO (Enhancement of Carrying Capacity Options) 
model."' The ECCO framework is a recent modeling approach explicitly devoted to the study of 
sustainable development. What made it particularly attractive to us was the existence of a Mauritian 
application (MECCO). We tried to obtain the equations of MECCO and of the generic ECCO model, 
but, given a very tight schedule, we did not succeed in getting them in time to include a review here. 
In ECCO models, the equations are written in terms of energy use and so are very different 
from those of the IIASA Mauritius model. With around 700 equations, the MECCO model is a large 
one and the task of comparing it with the IIASA model would have been both challenging and 
interesting. So, a comparative study of the two approaches must be left on the agenda for future 
work. 
This chapter neglects a whole set of models oriented toward energy use and the consequent 
atmospheric pollution.41 One of these, the Edmonds-Reilly model (see, for example, Edmonds and 
Reilly (1983 and 1985)) is evolving into a model that seems like it could be used for the study of 
sustainable development (Edmonds et d. (199 I)), but the new "second generation" model was not yet 
running when this chapter was written. Reviewing these models would have lead us much too far 
from our main themes. 
There are other interesting models that we left out as well (see Barney et d. (1991) for a list 
of some of these). There were severe limits to the growth of this chapter and overshooting them 
would have led to a painfully personal crash. 
8. TOWARD THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUSTAINABLE MODELS 
If the discussion between biologists, demographers, ecologists, economists, and others is to 
become more productive in the future, it has to move beyond the current cycle of scare and soothe 
studies. On the one hand, we are told that our economy will crash and our children and grandchildren 
will be devastated by famine and disease, and, on the other hand, we are told that everything will be 
fine forever. To break this cycle, requires that we become more committed to science and less to 
causes. It requires that we do not first decide what is most important and then try to convince others 
by presenting only the pieces of information that fit our preconceptions. It requires a dedication to the 
quantification of the results of different polices and, above all, it requires that biologists, 
demographers, ecologists, and economists listen to one another, and take one another seriously. 
The Mauritius model project is an attempt to break out of the cycle of scare and soothe studies, 
by treating a variety of concerns in an evenhanded manner. More than anything else, this is its 
greatest strength. 
But are modeling schools that focus on science sustainable? Science can be messy. One kind 
of effect can dominate in some countries, but not in others. Will agencies fund projects that show that 
*See Gilbert and Braat (1991) for a general description of the model and for some case studies. 
41A good starting point for studying these models is The Energv Journal Special Issue on Global 
Warming 12(1), 1991. It contains applications of some currently active models and references to many 
others. 
sometimes their favorite interventions are very useful and that sometimes they have a marginal impact? 
If not, the public will be left wandering in a land filled with alternating visions of havoc and 
prosperity, until perhaps one of them came true. There must be a better way to find out on which side 
of the looking-glass our path lies. 
ECONOMIST: "What do you think of Mauritius so far?" 
ECOLOGIST: "It seems pleasant enough. But then again, we haven't gotten very far. There 
seems to be concern about pollution and environment here. I like that." 
"And a variety of options for improving the environment are considered. I like that," she said. 
Just as she finished, she glanced down and saw a group of strange looking birds walking in front of 
her. She picked one up. "Look," she said, "they don't have any wings; none of them have any 
wings." 
"That's impossible," he said, picking up another one of them. 
"What is it?" she asked. 
"I don't know," he replied as he looked through its feathers. "Its got small vestigial wings 
hidden under its feathers. It obviously can't fly. I've never seen anything like it in my life. They 
certainly seem to like this forest," he continued. "They're all over the place." 
They were standing in a forest of large trees. She looked around and said, "What kind of trees 
are these, anyway?" 
He looked at the trees and then at a branch that had fallen to the ground. The wood was jet 
black. "These look like ..." He caught himself before he finished his sentence. "And we're on 
Mauritius, right?" 
"Yes," she said. 
"Then," pointing at one of the birds, he went on, "these must be.. .oh, for heaven's sake, I think 
I know exactly what these are. These birds are dodo birds, and those trees are ebony trees." 
"But dodo birds are extinct," she said. 
"And there are no more ebony trees on Mauritius," he said continuing her thought. "They were 
unpriced and uncontrolled common property resources caught in positive feedback loops," he said and 
they both laughed. 
"Do you think there are any positive feedback loops on Mauritius today," she asked. 
"Of course, " he answered. 
"How about betting on that," she said, "double or nothing." 
"You're on," he replied. "Let's go see." 
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